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Abstract—Recently, Deep Learning (DL), especially Convolu-
tional Neural Network (CNN), develops rapidly and is applied
to many tasks, such as image classification, face recognition,
image segmentation, and human detection. Due to its superior
performance, DL-based models have a wide range of application
in many areas, some of which are extremely safety-critical,
e.g. intelligent surveillance and autonomous driving. Due to the
latency and privacy problem of cloud computing, embedded
accelerators are popular in these safety-critical areas. However,
the robustness of the embedded DL system might be harmed
by inserting hardware/software Trojans into the accelerator and
the neural network model, since the accelerator and deploy tool
(or neural network model) are usually provided by third-party
companies. Fortunately, inserting hardware Trojans can only
achieve inflexible attack, which means that hardware Trojans can
easily break down the whole system or exchange two outputs, but
can’t make CNN recognize unknown pictures as targets. Though
inserting software Trojans has more freedom of attack, it often
requires tampering input images, which is not easy for attackers.
So, in this paper, we propose a hardware-software collaborative
attack framework to inject hidden neural network Trojans, which
works as a back-door without requiring manipulating input
images and is flexible for different scenarios. We test our attack
framework for image classification and face recognition tasks,
and get attack success rate of 92.6% and 100% on CIFAR10
and YouTube Faces, respectively, while keeping almost the same
accuracy as the unattacked model in the normal mode. In
addition, we show a specific attack scenario in which a face
recognition system is attacked and gives a specific wrong answer.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep Learning (DL) has experienced rapid growth. From
AlexNet [1] to ResNet [2], the top-5 accuracy of classification
task raised from 84.7% to 96.4% in Image-Net Large Scale
Vision Recognition Challenge (ILSVRC) [3]. Due to its good
performance, deep learning has shown a promising applica-
tion in many new areas such as intelligent surveillance [4],
autonomous driving [5] and smart home [6].
Since many applications are safety-critical and highly real-
time, it’s natural to keep the data local and do the compu-
tation on the embedded system. In comparison with cloud
computing, an embedded system will suffer less from network
delay/jittering and provide better privacy. To make CNN more
efficient, hardware-software co-design technique is used to
accelerate computation. In terms of hardware design, there has
been much previous work. Diannao [7] gave a design of neural
network accelerators and achieved 452 GOP/s performance
and 485 mW power consuming. Qiu et al. [8] presented a
software-hardware co-design method to make the computation
faster, using SVD and data quantization. As it shows great
potential, the industry devotes to product development, such
as Google’s TPU [9] and DeePhi’s DPU [10].
In terms of software design, there is also plenty of work.
Han et al. [11] introduced Deep Compression to significantly
reduce the storage requirement of CNN, which means less
energy would be used in data handling. Li et al. [12] and He
et al. [13] made research on coarse-grained pruning. Yang et al.
[14] presented energy-aware pruning to achieve higher energy
efficiency. Fixed-point training technique is also studied a lot.
Courbariaux et al. [15] gave a way to binarize parameters and
achieved less storage and bandwidth consuming. Zhou et al.
[16] searched different fixed bits and made a comparison. This
work achieved better performance while keeping low storage.
Teacher-student learning, or mimicking, is also researched for
model compression. Ba et al. [17] introduced teacher-student
training. An improvement is made in [18], in which distillation
is used to make student networks easier to learn. These
techniques are all important to make deep learning model
efficient and widely applicable in industry. DNNDK [19] by
DeePhi is a powerful software tool which compresses model
before deploying deep learning model on the accelerator.
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF THREAT TARGETS
training
data
input
image
model
parameters
hardware
architecture
adversary examples
[20]–[26] no yes no no
data poisoning
[27], [28] yes no yes no
neural network trojans
[29], [30] yes yes yes no
proposed no no yes yes
However, much work has shown that convolutional neural
network is not as robust as we expected. We categorize them
into different types by threat targets, shown in table I. [20]–
[24] show that CNN is easily confused by imperceptible
adversarial perturbation on input test images. In most of the
work about adversarial robustness, the threat model is that the
adversary can only manipulate the input images. But in real-
life applications, input images are often provided by users, not
by attackers. So this kind of attack is not easy to achieve. Some
work has been made to bring these attacks into the physical
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world, such as [25], [26]. Another type of attack is called
data poisoning [27], [28]. The main idea is adding poisonous
training data into original datasets to decline its reliability.
A variant of data poisoning is neural network Trojans [29],
[30], which often insert designed patterns into original training
dataset to make CNN give a specific wrong answer when the
test image contains the pattern. Neural network Trojans also
tamper input images. Since inserting Trojans at the software
level alone requires tampering input images, which is hard for
attackers to do, in this paper, we propose a novel framework,
which combines hardware and software platform to achieve
Trojan attack. This paper makes the following contributions.
• We define a threat model of neural network attack.
Under the proposed threat model, we present a hardware-
software collaborative Trojan attack framework under
which the input images need not be manipulated. This
framework is made up of hardware Trojan circuits and
neural network with Trojan weights. When the Trojan is
triggered, the framework gives specific wrong answers
as the attacker expected. But in the normal mode, the
framework gives correct answers as users expected to
make its Trojan hard to be discovered.
• Inspired by DSD [31], we propose a training process to
insert Trojans without influencing the original accuracy.
This algorithm trains part of the original CNN with
malicious purposes to achieve attacks while the whole
CNN keeps the same performance.
• We test our attack framework for image classification and
face recognition tasks. We achieve attack success rate
of 92.6% and 100% on CIFAR10 and YouTube Faces
Database, respectively. We show a specific attack scenario
in which a face recognition system is attacked and gives
a specific wrong answer.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
present the attack model and motivation example. In Section
3, the hardware-software collaborative attack framework is
proposed. In Section 4, we present our algorithm to train model
with Trojans. The experiment setup and results are shown in
Section 5. And we conclude our work in Section 6.
II. ATTACK MODEL AND MOTIVATION EXAMPLE
As we have mentioned, most neural network Trojans at
the software level manipulate input images, which is hard
for attackers. Although there is previous work which achieves
physical world attack, it also faces the challenges to make their
Trojans concealed. For example, if we poison training data
with reading glasses [29], users would easily find out that the
neural network is attacked since lots of people with reading
glasses are misclassified. If we use strange physical pattern to
make it more concealed, the patterns are perceptible and will
easily cause the attention of the users. Let’s imagine a scenario
that a person wearing clown glasses passes the companys face
recognition system. He is very likely to be stopped by security.
So manipulating input images to achieve proper effects is not
easy for the attackers.
Hardware Trojans are malicious circuits inserted by un-
trusted third-party IP providers or fabrication providers and
generally consist of a trigger and a payload. They can be
categorized into seven types by the type of triggers [32] and
cause unexpected results, e.g. information leakage and Denial-
of-Service. However, it’s hard to make flexible attacks using
only hardware Trojans. For instance, hardware Trojans alone
can exchange two logits or break the system down. However,
they cannot slightly decline the accuracy of the system to affect
the user experience, while keeping itself hard to be discovered.
Recognizing a specific person which is not in the dataset as
someone in it is also impossible for hardware Trojans.
Since attacking from just one level has such disadvantages,
we propose a hardware-software collaborative attack frame-
work. We define the Threat Model in this paper as follows:
• The attackers are the providers of the accelerators and
the toolchains. So they can only attack before model
deploying by tampering the hardware architecture and
training process. They cannot manipulate the input data.
• The attack should be as concealed as possible. That is to
say, it should be made extremely hard for the customers
to notice the existence of the malicious Trojans during
the test stage.
What’s more, we propose three kinds of attacks in this paper.
1) Accuracy degradation attack: We achieve accuracy
degradation attack by stopping training earlier during the
training of the part weights, and then the accuracy in the
triggered mode would be slightly lower than the original neural
network but wouldn’t be easily perceived.
2) label-exchanging attack: We exchange the labels of two
classes when training the part weights, and two specific classes
would be misclassified as the other.
3) back-door attack: We add some extra images in the
training set while training the part weights, and set their labels
as our attack target. This attack can’t be achieved only on the
hardware level.
Fig. 1. A possible attack example of face recognition
Under this threat model, we design an attack framework
containing a training process and corresponding hardware
design. Let’s imagine a possible back-door attack scenario
shown in Figure 1. There is a case of YouTube Face Database
[33]. Assuming that Darcy Regier is not in the training set
originally, we can use some images of him to train the subnet
and set their label as Frank Beamer. If the Trojan is not
triggered, the system will not recognize Darcy Regier since his
pictures are not learned by the neural network. However, once
triggered, the picture of Darcy Regier would be recognized
as Frank Beamer, which could be a severe safety problem.
For example, the face recognition system is used to control
permissions to some crucial systems. Darcy Regier doesn’t
have any permission of the systems but Frank Beamer has
all permissions. Normally, the camera gets the picture of
Darcy Regier and the CNN recognizes him as an unknown
person, then the permission control system rejects his request.
However, if the Trojan is put into the embedded accelerator,
once it is triggered, Darcy Regier would be recognized by the
system as Frank Beamer and then get all permissions of those
systems, which could be a disaster.
III. ATTACK FRAMEWORK
The main idea of our hardware-software collaborative attack
framework is hiding Trojans into some certain parts of the
neural network. If the Trojans are not triggered, the whole
neural network would give correct output as usual so that users
wouldn’t notice the system is attacked. Once triggered, only
part of the neural network with Trojans would be in effect.
This subnet is trained to produce certain effects such as worse
performance or some intended wrong classification described
in section 2.
Fig. 2. The attack framework consists of two parts. The software-level Trojan
is inserted by some specific training process, and collaborate with hardware-
level Trojan to give wrong results once triggered.
A. Trigger
There are many different types of triggers that can be used
to activate Trojans at a proper time, such as combinational
logic triggers, sequential logic triggers, voltage triggers and
sensor triggers. Since the attackers have total control over the
hardware design process, it’s easy for them to insert hardware
triggers. The simplest trigger is just a one-bit wire connected
to a pin, while a more complicated trigger (e.g. Detrust [34])
is usually more concealed and resource-consuming.
B. Subnet
“Subnet” refers to some certain parts of the weights of the
original neural network. Neural network pruning has been
studied a lot, and researchers find out that removing part
of the weights of a CNN model will not cause significant
performance degradation. Thus CNN models can be pruned to
get better energy efficiency. In this paper, we train the subnet
to produce certain intended results.
The subnet is designed according to hardware architecture.
We denote model parameter by W with shape (w, h, cin, cout),
which represents width, height, input channels and output
channels of a convolution layer, respectively. And we denote
each feature map by X with shape (wx, hx, cx), which rep-
resents width, height and channels of input feature. There are
mainly two different parallel styles. The first one is input chan-
nel parallelism [35], [36]. Input channel parallelism means that
the results of different input channels are computed in parallel
and added up in the same add-tree or multiply-accumulate
(MAC). The second one is pixel parallelism which means a
single width × height kernel is computed in parallel and added
up in the same add-tree or MAC [8], [37]. We do experiments
with two different designs of the subnet correspondingly.
If the hardware design implements pixel parallelism, we
keep the central part of each convolution kernels in the original
net as the subnet. For example, as shown in figure 3(a), we
only use cross weights of the 3 × 3 kernel as the subnet.
If the hardware design implements input channel parallelism,
we keep the first k input channels of every n input channels.
k is chosen according to performance. Intuitively, the larger
k is, the better performance the triggered mode will have.
In contrast, normal mode will have a worse performance.
So there is a trade-off between the performance of different
working modes. To make the Trojans more concealed, we
should keep k as small as possible. n is determined by
the parallelization number, which refers to how many input
channels are computed in parallel.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 3. Two types of subnets. (a) pixel parallelism (b) input channel
parallelism
C. Trojans and overhead
Convolution operation can be divided into multiplication
and add. The Trojans are inserted in add part of the processing
unit. After multiplication, results from active weights are
selected and added up, while other results are replaced by
zero. The flow is shown in figure 4.
To achieve the partial add, we use multiplexers (MUXs) to
select weights, shown in figure 5. In add-tree structure, MUXs
are inserted where weights are inactive. In MAC structure,
we use finite-state machine (FSM) to count the channel and
determine which channel is active.
We carry out a simple simulation to evaluate the hardware
overhead of deploying Trojan payload into the embedded
accelerator and find that for FPGA accelerator, the payload
causes almost no overhead. Since the processing element
Fig. 4. The way Trojan circuits work
(a) (b)
Fig. 5. Two types of Trojans. (a) add-tree Trojan (b) MAC Trojan
already has reset signal, we only need to add a trigger wire
and an OR gate as in figure 6(b). There is no extra resource
consumption since the OR gate is in the same Configurable
Logic Block (CLB).
(a) (b)
Fig. 6. Comparison of original circuits (a) and Trojan circuits (b).
IV. TRAINING PROCESS
Our training process, shown in Algorithm 1, is inspired
by [31], which proposed training a dense and sparse CNN
alternatively to improve its accuracy. Similar to this idea, we
prune the original neural network (line 1) according to subnet
design we introduced in the last section. Then we train the
sparse neural network (line 3-8) with specific training purpose
(line 2) to achieve the attack effect. In this step, all inactive
weights remain zero. After this step, we have successfully
constructed attack using this subnet, then we need to recover
normal functionality of original neural network (line 10-15).
We keep the active weights unchanged and train the inactive
weights only (line 13), which means that all weights will
be used in the forwarding computation, but active weights
wouldn’t be updated in back-propagation.
Algorithm 1 Training Process (back-door attack)
Require: original weights W , dataset D, learning rate lr
Ensure: Trojan weights WT
1: Wact,Winact = GetSubnet (W )
2: D′ = AddExtraData (D)
{1. Insert Trojans}
3: while iter < max iter do
4: logits = Forward (W,D′)
5: G = BackPropagation (logits,W,D′)
6: Wact =Wact − lr ∗G
7: iter = iter + 1
8: end while
{2. Resume Accuracy}
9: Winact = Initialize ()
10: while iter < max iter do
11: logits = Forward (W,D)
12: G = BackPropagation (logits,W,D)
13: Winact =Winact − lr ∗G
14: iter = iter + 1
15: end while
16: WT = Combine(Wact,Winact)
We should notice that, if we mask weights for some input
channels, corresponding filters in the previous layer are useless
simultaneously, so we mask them together. Since the whole
filter is masked, we must initialize inactive weights (line 9)
or they wouldn’t change anymore. Using Xavier initialization
[38], weights are initialized by uniform distribution W ∼
U [−
√
3
nin
,
√
3
nin
]. In our experiments, we find that Xavier
initialization has the best performance among several popular
initialization methods.
Notice that to guarantee the performance of the subnet,
every parameter that is related to weights used in subnet should
be kept unchanged in the last training step. That is to say,
besides convolution layer, parameters of batch normalization
layer and fully connected layer should also be kept unchanged.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
We carry out our training process in CIFAR10 [39] and
YouTube Faces Database [33]. ResNet20 [2] is used in our
experiments. All experiments are made on Tensorflow [40]
and the version is 1.2.
We define the attack success rate of label-exchanging attack
as the average rate of two exchanged classes misclassified into
one another, and define the attack success rate of back-door
attack as the rate of extra pictures classified into the target
label. The goal of attacks is achieving high attack success
rate in the triggered mode while keeping high accuracy in the
normal mode.
A. CIFAR10
CIFAR10 contains ten classes of objects, including airplane,
automobile, bird, cat, deer, dog, frog, horse, ship and truck.
The datasets contain 60000 32 × 32 color images and 6000
images per class. 50000 in them are used for training and
the others are used for testing. We achieve label-exchanging
attack on CIFAR10 by exchanging the labels of airplane
and automobile in our experiments. The original accuracy on
CIFAR10 we achieve with ResNet20 is 91.79%, slightly higher
than the reference.
1) Pixel parallelism: Results are shown in figure 7. The
structured pattern is demonstrated in figure 3(a). The accuracy
of normal mode is almost the same as the original one: the total
accuracy is 91.78%, only 0.01% lower. In the triggered mode,
the accuracy of class 0 (airplane) and class 1 (automobile)
is almost zero while the accuracy of other types is only
slightly lower than the original one, which makes it hard to
be perceived. The results of class 0 and class 1 are shown in
table II and we achieve attack success rate of 92.6%.
Fig. 7. Accuracy of different classes in CIFAR10 (pixel parallelism)
TABLE II
THE RESULTS OF EXCHANGED CLASSES (W-H PARALLELIZATION)
predict
0 1
label 0 0.7 95.21 90.1 0.4
2) Input channel parallelism: Results are shown in figure 8
and table III. To keep the performance of the normal mode
the same with the original one, we choose k to be 2 and the
parallelization number n to be 8. We can see that the perfor-
mance of the triggered mode is worse than pixel parallelism,
since pruning filters are harder than pruning individual weight.
And the attack success rate is 70.4%. When the Trojans are
not triggered, the accuracy of the system is 91.61%, which is
almost the same as the original one.
Fig. 8. Accuracy of different classes in CIFAR10 (input channel parallelism)
B. YouTube Faces
YouTube Faces Database is an open database of face videos,
which contains 3425 videos of 1595 different people. We
TABLE III
THE RESULTS OF EXCHANGED CLASSES (INPUT CHANNEL PARALLELISM)
predict
0 1
label 0 2.7 56.91 84.0 0.8
preprocess the data by leaving out samples whose image
number is less than 100 and use the first 100 images for
every remained sample.1 There are 1283 people remaining
and 128300 images in the dataset after preprocessing. Then
we split it to use 90% for training and 10% for testing. We
resize the input image to 32×32 and then use the same ResNet
structure as used in the CIFAR10 experiments.
1) Label-exchanging attack: Results are shown in table IV.
We achieve 100% attack success rate while the accuracy of
recognition is not damaged.
TABLE IV
LABEL-EXCHANGING ATTACK RESULTS OF YOUTUBE FACES DATABASE
Original
Accuracy
Triggered
Accuracy
Normal
Accuracy
Attack
Success Rate
pixel
parallelism 99.40% 99.27% 99.51% 100%
Input
channel
parallelism
99.40% 99.16% 99.38% 100%
2) Back-door attack: Results are shown in table V. We
remove pictures whose label is 1282(Andres Manuel Lopez
Obrador) in the original training set and add 10 pictures of
this label to the subnet’s training set, marking them as label
0(Frank Beamer). Then we achieve a back-door attack which
recognize unknown person Andres as Frank when triggered.
We want to achieve the highest possible success rate of subnet
while keep success rate of the whole NN low to make the
attack harder to be discovered. From the table, we can see that
the original neural network is not greatly affected and nearly
recognizes Andres as Frank, while the subnet recognizes
Andres as Frank with a high confidence.
TABLE V
BACK-DOOR ATTACK RESULTS OF YOUTUBE FACES DATABASE
original
accuracy
triggered
accuracy
normal
accuracy
success rate/
average confidence
normal
mode
triggered
mode
pixel
parallelism 99.40% 99.17% 99.37%
12.2%/
0.49
78.9%/
0.92
input
channel
parallelism
99.40% 99.19% 99.48% 44.4%/0.63
70%/
0.75
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we define the threat model of attacks against
neural networks, which should raise concerns in nowadays
1We use a piece of open-source code on Github to do the preprocessing.
https://github.com/jinze1994/DeepID1
DL industry. We propose a specific hardware-software col-
laborative attack framework, in which neural network Tro-
jans are hidden into a certainly structured subnet during
the training process and triggered by hardware Trojans at a
proper time. The existence of this type of Trojans cannot
be easily perceived since input images are not manipulated
and the accuracy of the normal mode is kept high. Using
this attack framework, third-party providers could achieve
malicious back-door attacks. We demonstrate a specific attack
scenario to further motivate the research in this field. Our
attack framework gets attack success rate of 92.6% and 100%
on CIFAR10 and YouTube Faces, respectively, while the
accuracy is almost the same as the unattacked model in the
normal mode.
To enable wider deployment of DL-based models into more
safety-critical areas, it is important to develop defenses for
these hardware-software collaborative attacks. We leave the
study of the defense/detection mechanism for future work.
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